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Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) present an answer to a critical account of their 25 
conformity interpretations (van Leeuwen et al., 2015). Their target study (van de Waal 26 
et al., 2013) evidenced immigrant male vervet monkeys adjusting their food colour 27 
preferences to the preference demonstrated by the resident vervets, which was 28 
interpreted in terms of conformity. Van Leeuwen and colleagues (2015; also see van 29 
Leeuwen & Haun, 2013 and online commentary by Tennie, Fischer, Galef & Haun, 30 
2013, at Sciencemag.org) acknowledged the insight gained from the reported 31 
observations for our understanding of social learning processes in wild primates, but 32 
criticized van de Waal et al.’s conformity interpretation (2013) as alternative learning 33 
biases, other than conformity, could not be ruled out. In their reply to this critique, 34 
Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) systematically list their arguments against 35 
alternative explanations. Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) also present new data 36 
indicating that in their target study (2013) the “majority of individuals” opting to 37 
perform a specific behaviour correlated with the “majority of behaviours” performed 38 
across the population, thereby adding to a recent debate about how “the majority” 39 
should be operationalized in order to study conformist transmission (see Aplin et al., 40 
2015a in response to van Leeuwen et al., 2015). Here, we respond to Whiten & van de 41 
Waal (this volume) by i) discussing how their arguments against our alternative 42 
explanations for their conformity interpretation (as advanced in van de Waal et al., 43 
2013) may be misguided, ii) defending the position that their presented correlation 44 
between the “majority of individuals” and the “majority of behaviours” is tangential to 45 
the current debate, iii) presenting evidence in favour of our original suggestion to keep 46 
reliance on the “majority of individuals” and the “majority of behaviours” as two 47 
separate learning biases, and iv) realigning the debate between Aplin et al. 2015a and 48 
van Leeuwen et al. 2015 to focus again on animals’ observation records as prerequisite 49 
knowledge to interpret their behavioural decisions in terms of learning biases. 50 
 51 
Alternative explanations 52 
 In line with Whiten & van de Waal (this volume), we define conformity as 53 
“abandoning personal preferences or behaviours to match alternatives exhibited by a 54 
majority of others” (Haun, van Leeuwen & Edelson, 2013). In their original study (van 55 
de Waal et al., 2013), male vervet monkeys who were trained to prefer one of two food 56 
colours in their native group immigrated to a new group where the alternative food 57 
colour was preferred and adjusted their preferences accordingly (except for one high-58 
ranking male who maintained his native preference). These immigrants were typically 59 
confronted with a large group of residents feeding from the alternative food colour, 60 
while very few or none of the residents fed from the food colour the immigrants were 61 
most familiar with (see illustrations in Whiten & van de Waal, this volume). Van de 62 
Waal et al. (2013) interpreted these behavioural adjustments by the immigrants as 63 
‘conformity’. In response to this interpretation, van Leeuwen & Haun (2014; also see 64 
van Leeuwen et al. 2015) pointed out that although the immigrants might have been 65 
guided by inclinations to conform to the majority, alternatively, they might have been 66 
guided by other (social) learning biases that are independent of majority considerations. 67 
For instance, the immigrants might have been focused on copying particular resident 68 
individuals, like visibly dominant individuals, or indeed any resident individual, 69 
precipitated by their immigration-induced stress, anxiety or general state of uncertainty. 70 
Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) replied to this suggestion by arguing that any 71 
transmission bias other than ‘copy-the-majority’ is unlikely to explain the switching 72 
behaviour of the immigrants. For instance, they argue that the fact that the immigrants 73 
do not have female kin in their new group rules out a kin-based learning rule. Likewise, 74 
they propose that male vervets are relatively poor in recognizing the social hierarchy of 75 
females, ruling out a ‘copy high-rankers’ learning rule (Whiten & van de Waal, this 76 
volume). While these particular proposals may or may not be correct, more generally, 77 
we wish to emphasize that although field experiments with wild animals are to be 78 
applauded for their ecological validity, they do not have any superior claim on 79 
epistemological validity. When confounding effects cannot be controlled for rigorously, 80 
interpretation of observed patterns need to be made cautiously. 81 
 Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) argue most forcefully against the ‘random 82 
copying’ interpretation of their data, stating that: ‘…for the immigrant vervets to copy 83 
just one individual randomly would seem rather perverse in the face of the repeated, 84 
extensive and quite consistent scenarios of multiple monkey preferences staring 85 
immigrants in the face…’ (line 95-98). We disagree. Clearly, the sheer availability of 86 
information is no guarantee it will be utilized in expected ways, or, at all. Random 87 
copying is as good a predictor of the observed patterns of transmission as conformity: 88 
When observer monkeys are consistently confronted with the majority of residents 89 
feeding from one particular food colour, while only a few, or none, of the resident 90 
monkeys feed from the alternative, copying a random individual would, 91 
probabilistically, boil down to observer monkeys tending to use the foraging option 92 
demonstrated by the majority rather than that demonstrated by the minority, irrespective 93 
of observers’ particular preference for copying the majority. We consider this a 94 
potentially more parsimonious explanation – if observer monkeys could obtain the 95 
locally practiced foraging rule by the mere inclination to copy, there is no need for them 96 
to apply a cognitively more demanding rule like ‘conform to majorities’. 97 
 Typically, an investigation of whether individuals copy the majority with a 98 
higher probability than the relative size of the majority (henceforth ‘the disproportionate 99 
criterion’) is applied to ascertain that individuals are indeed majority-biased, or at least 100 
to exclude the possibility that individuals merely copy randomly (e.g. Laland, 2004; 101 
Mesoudi, 2009). We note that the disproportionate criterion can be viewed as rather 102 
stringent and unrealistic for cases in which individuals have already obtained a working 103 
strategy, where the key behaviour of interest is the foregoing of prior information for an 104 
alternative (‘conformity’). Indeed, the disproportionate criterion is typically used in the 105 
context of naive individuals setting out to obtain a useful strategy by means of social 106 
learning; the context in which conformist transmission (CT) is studied (e.g. Boyd & 107 
Richerson, 1985; Morgan et al., 2014). In the CT context, when individuals are 108 
confronted with a balanced population in which only two possible strategies exist, it is 109 
assumed that copiers solely rely on social information and thus have a 50% likelihood 110 
of obtaining one or the other strategy. Similarly, when strategy A is wielded by 70% of 111 
the demonstrators, and strategy B thus only by 30%, copiers have a 70% likelihood of 112 
obtaining strategy A by chance, i.e. if they were to apply a random copying rule. To 113 
show that individuals preferentially copy the majority, and not just by chance, the 114 
disproportionate criterion should be adhered to, meaning that in this case copiers should 115 
have a likelihood of obtaining strategy A that is significantly larger than 70%. However, 116 
in this same example, if individuals are not naive and thus have already learned to 117 
prefer one strategy over the other, e.g. strategy B, the assumption that they will obtain 118 
strategy A or B with a 50% likelihood (in the balanced 2-variant population) is 119 
unrealistic. Instead, these experienced individuals will most likely stick to their familiar 120 
strategy, in this case strategy B. In a similar vein, experienced strategy B users will not 121 
have a 70% chance of ending up with strategy A when 70% of the population they 122 
could sample from are strategy A users. If these experienced individuals turn out to start 123 
using strategy A with a 70% likelihood, in fact, one could consider this to be a strong 124 
indication (‘disproportionate’ in a sense) of majority influence (see Haun, Rekers & 125 
Tomasello, 2014). Thus, contrary to the CT setting, when individuals are experienced, it 126 
seems less valid to interpret a copying probability in accord with the relative majority 127 
size (here: 70%) in terms of random copying: past experience must be weighted in and 128 
perhaps a lower threshold than the majority display accepted as strong evidence for 129 
conformity (see van Leeuwen & Haun, 2014). 130 
 For the vervet monkeys (van de Waal et al., 2013), given that i) they were 131 
indeed experienced in preferring one food colour over the other when they encountered 132 
the opposing demonstrations in the new population, and ii) many of them chose to eat 133 
from the food colour in accord with these preference-opposing demonstrations (perhaps 134 
in numbers approximately matching the relative majority size, although here, crucially, 135 
this cannot be confirmed as the vervets’ observation records are missing; see below for 136 
more on this topic), this might indicate that ‘random copying’ could be dismissed as a 137 
mechanistic explanation in favour of ‘majority copying’. It is important to note, 138 
however, that this conclusion rests on the crucial assumption that no other variables 139 
were at play in the decision arena of the respective vervets, which is arguably not true. 140 
Notably, the immigrant vervets were leaving behind a familiar home range, and social 141 
setting, while moving into an unknown territory with unknown conspecifics (‘a 142 
different habitat’: van de Waal et al., 2013, p. 484). We could envisage the very 143 
predicament of the migrating vervets as sufficiently potent to induce a motivation to 144 
obtain new, locally more attuned behaviours (ecologically and/or socially). Van de 145 
Waal and colleagues (2013; also see Whiten & van de Waal, this volume) acknowledge 146 
that such drastic changes in the lives of the vervets could have facilitated the so-called 147 
‘copy-when-uncertain’ rule (Laland, 2004), a social learning heuristic for which 148 
evidence has been found across a wide range of taxa (e.g. see Kendal et al., 2009). They 149 
explicitly echo our suggestion by writing: “The fitness of foraging decisions made by 150 
wild primates like those we studied will be governed by a host of complex factors that 151 
are inherently unknown to foragers, ranging from dietary constituents to plant toxins 152 
and competing needs such as predator vigilance: Exploiting the prior discoveries of 153 
local experts may be an optimal strategy, overriding opposing knowledge gained in a 154 
different habitat such as one’s original group.” (van de Waal et al., 2013, p. 484). Yet, 155 
crucially, neither van de Waal et al. (2013) nor Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) 156 
consider the possibility that the ‘copy-when-uncertain’ heuristic alone could have 157 
caused the immigrants to adjust their foraging preference upon entering their new 158 
environment. It is entirely reasonable that the uncertainty of their new environment 159 
changed the default information-gathering mode of the immigrants to “copy” anybody 160 
(instead of relying on possibly out-dated and locally inadequate personal strategies). 161 
 Given the discussion above, and widespread local foraging traditions, the 162 
simplest form of copying – random copying – would equip the immigrating vervets 163 
with the local “majority” strategy. In other words, the transition from home to unknown 164 
territory could have reset the vervet monkeys, rendering prior information irrelevant, 165 
turning them effectively into naïve learners. We call this the “reset hypothesis”. One 166 
possible way to empirically test this hypothesis is to investigate whether immigrants 167 
would switch to the local foraging preference upon seeing a small number of residents 168 
showing a preference against an even larger background of non-behaving others, or, 169 
maybe a simpler case, upon seeing just one single resident’s demonstration of this 170 
preference (something that may have been opportunistically possible to assess had 171 
immigrant observation records been acquired, see below). If these observers would 172 
switch their preference, majorities would cease to be the single possible object of the 173 
immigrants’ copying efforts. Indeed, drawing on parsimony again, this finding would 174 
indicate that “conformity” is not even necessary to explain the immigrants’ behaviour. 175 
Note that even if one adheres to the conformity definition of ‘a willingness to subjugate 176 
one’s own countervailing knowledge in matching the majority’s choice’ – as in van de 177 
Waal et al. 2013 supplementary material p. 6 – one is still left with the burden of proof 178 
for the claim that ‘the majority’ is being matched, not just any individual. 179 
 Overall, the problem with interpreting the observations made by van de Waal et 180 
al. (2013) is the lack of nuance in the data regarding observer monkeys responding to 181 
different majority/minority ratios of (inadvertent) demonstrator monkeys. If observers 182 
are only presented with one stimulus (“the majority”), which consists of many other 183 
stimuli (“general social information”, “high-ranking individuals”, “low-ranking 184 
individuals”, “conspicuous individuals”, etc.), it is impossible to disentangle the very 185 
learning bias that the observers follow, while this is exactly what we want to know (e.g. 186 
see Heyes, 2016). For instance, if we were to investigate the evolutionary roots of 187 
conformist decision-making and we find that immigrant vervet monkeys, patas 188 
monkeys and rhesus macaques all adjust their preferences to the majority of the new 189 
group, we would need to know whether they were biased to “the majority” or to any 190 
other cue provided by the majority, for without this knowledge, the apparent similarity 191 
in decision-making strategies across these species may be purely coincidental. 192 
 193 
Majority of individuals versus majority of behaviours 194 
Due to our emphasis (van Leeuwen et al., 2015) upon the need for observation records 195 
in interpreting transmission events, we are delighted to find more detailed analysis on 196 
the observation records of the vervet monkeys (van de Waal et al., 2013) in their follow-197 
up paper (Whiten & van de Waal (this volume)). Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) 198 
present an analysis of how the number of individuals feeding from the locally-preferred 199 
food colour correlated with the number of behaviours (handfuls of corn) regarding this 200 
same food colour. Specifically, they state: “Indeed the two variables [individuals and 201 
behaviours] show a significant correlation across the twelve sample periods (r = 0.67, n 202 
= 12, p = 0.018). Accordingly we infer that the migrant males’ striking switch from 203 
their own to the opposite local preference was an effect of these majority displays, and 204 
hence a case of conformity” (Whiten & van de Waal, this volume, L69-73). To clarify, 205 
Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) aim to address a subject pertaining to the analysis 206 
of conformist transmission that was discussed in van Leeuwen et al. (2015) and Aplin et 207 
al. (2015a). In summary, where van Leeuwen et al. (2015) argued for keeping separate 208 
the biases of following the majority of individuals versus the majority of observed 209 
behaviours, and only reserving the term ‘conformist transmission’ for the former, Aplin 210 
et al. (2015a) argued for grouping the biases together under the same term, i.e. 211 
‘conformist transmission’. Aplin et al. (2015a) based their argument on the fact that in 212 
their original great tit study (Aplin et al. 2015b), the birds did not seem to distinguish 213 
between individuals and behaviours (analysed in Aplin et al. 2015a). Following up on 214 
this debate, Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) echo Aplin et al.’s position by 215 
showing that in their vervet monkey study (van de Waal et al., 2013) the frequency of 216 
individuals using a certain behavioural option and the frequency of demonstration of 217 
this particular behavioural option in total were not affecting the observers differently. In 218 
other words, the monkeys were indistinguishably following the majority of individuals 219 
and the majority of behaviours (Whiten & van de Waal, this volume). 220 
 While we acknowledge the additional analysis and appreciate its intent, we do 221 
not find it compelling for several reasons. First and foremost, in line with our previous 222 
arguments, Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) neither use the frequency of 223 
individuals nor behaviours to test their conformity hypothesis against any other (social) 224 
learning bias. Therefore, the reported correlation between the frequency of individuals 225 
and behaviours, while representing an affirmation of internal validity, has no power to 226 
falsify alternative hypotheses. For instance, Aplin et al. (2015b), though confronted with 227 
similar limitations due to working with wild animal populations, obtained detailed 228 
records of birds responding to differently-sized majorities and incorporated their 229 
majority numbers, in terms of individuals and behaviours, into statistical analyses to 230 
provide insight regarding whether the birds actually used the majority cue or merely 231 
obtained the most common strategy randomly. Without such analysis, our 232 
understanding of transmission biases is not furthered by the reporting of a correlation 233 
between two possible measures. Note that due to the very nature of “the majority” (i.e. 234 
comprising more than half of the sampled individuals) measures of for instance, skilful, 235 
conspicuous and high-ranking individuals will also coincide with the majority strategy. 236 
 Furthermore, we note that two cases of correlation between the number of 237 
individuals and behaviours indicating the use of a particular strategy (Aplin et al., 2015a 238 
and Whiten & van de Waal, this volume) do not constitute sufficient evidence in favour 239 
of the two measures being ‘functionally equivalent’. While scenarios in which the 240 
number of individuals and behaviours correlate are straightforward to envision, we 241 
could imagine other scenarios in which the two respective measures would diverge, 242 
either due to individual differences in performance rates (in conjunction with relative 243 
preferences for certain strategies) or population structure (increasing the likelihood of 244 
repetitively sampling the same individuals). Moreover, for reasons of informational 245 
accuracy, it may well matter if one individual “cries wolf” ten times, or if ten 246 
individuals (independently) do so once (e.g. see Wolf et al., 2013). We conjecture that 247 
the adaptive value of relying on indiscriminate sampling of behaviours versus relying 248 
on the aggregate knowledge of similarly poised, unpredictability-reducing conspecifics 249 
will differ to the extent that under certain conditions, one particular bias is expected to 250 
evolve (at the expense of the other). Formal modelling would be a constructive way 251 
forward in fuelling our understanding and expectations regarding this pending question, 252 
which was acknowledged by Aplin et al. (2015a). In the absence of such understanding, 253 
we fail to see how grouping two potentially distinct social learning biases (see Haun et 254 
al., 2012) under one and the same denominator of “conformist transmission” could be 255 
beneficial to the (comparative) study of learning biases. 256 
 257 
Methodological concern for using the majority of ‘behaviours’ instead of ‘individuals’ 258 
In addition to our conceptual arguments in favour of keeping separate the biases of 259 
relying on the majority of individuals versus the majority of behaviours (also see van 260 
Leeuwen et al., 2015), we now present a methodological argument in favour of this 261 
proposition. Specifically, we note that the gold standard to evidence conformist 262 
transmission has been to identify a sigmoidal relation between individuals’ probability 263 
to copy the majority and the proportional majority size (e.g., see Boyd & Richerson, 264 
1985; Chou & Richerson, 1992; Claidiere et al., 2012; Battesti et al., 2015; Aplin et al., 265 
2015b; but see Acerbi et al., under review). A simple agent-based model may help 266 
illustrate one of the problems arising from considering the frequencies of behaviours, 267 
instead of the frequencies of individuals, in detecting this sigmoidal signature of 268 
conformist transmission. 269 
 Imagine a population of individuals randomly initialised with one of two 270 
behaviours, A and B. At each time step, one individual X is randomly selected from the 271 
population, and performs its allocated behaviour, and another individual Y is also 272 
randomly selected from the population, and then Y always copies the behaviour 273 
performed by X. If one plots the relation between the probability of copying a behaviour 274 
and the frequency of individuals that possess that behaviour at time t, the relation is 275 
perfectly linear (see Figure 1, left). Each behaviour is, in other words, copied with a 276 
probability equal to the frequency of individuals that possess it in the population. This is 277 
exactly what we would expect with unbiased – i.e. random – copying (e.g. see Boyd & 278 
Richerson, 1985; Henrich & Boyd, 1998; Mesoudi, 2009). 279 
 280 
FIGURE 1. 281 
 282 
 However, if we plot the relation between the probability of copying a behaviour 283 
and the frequency of behaviour observed in the population, we obtain a sigmoidal 284 
relation, that can be mistaken for a signature of conformist transmission (see Figure 1, 285 
right). The reason for this result is that, as behaviours where randomly initialised, the 286 
total frequency (over all time steps) of the majority behaviour in the population will be, 287 
in most cases, lower than the frequency of individuals that possess that behaviour at 288 
time t. Imagine that behaviour A reaches fixation in the population. The probability to 289 
copy A will be 100%, but its cumulative frequency will be somewhat lower, as, at the 290 
beginning, at least some individuals performed behaviour B. This behavioural mixture 291 
is sufficient to create the effect in the bottom-left and top-right portions of the function, 292 
typical of a sigmoidal relation. 293 
 This effect is an artefact of how populations are initialised in the model, i.e. 294 
starting from a random mixture of the two behaviours, but it clearly shows that different 295 
analysis may lead to different results. More specifically, in this case, the analysis based 296 
on individuals reveals perfect linearity, in keeping with the individual-level random 297 
copying default, whereas the analysis based on behaviours reveals the sigmoidal 298 
relation between copying probability and relative frequency characteristic of conformist 299 
transmission (see Aplin et al., 2015b). In other words, the analysis based on behaviours 300 
leads to a detection of conformist transmission where clearly there is none (because all 301 
copying here is random). 302 
 A slightly more complex model shows an analogous result, without the need to 303 
initialise the populations in the above way. In this set-up, populations start naïve, and 304 
the two possible behaviours are instead introduced through individual innovations (each 305 
behaviour – A or B – with the same probability). Note that this set-up reflects the 306 
scenario in which conformist transmission is typically studied (e.g. Boyd & Richerson, 307 
1985; Henrich & Boyd, 1998; Morgan & Laland, 2012; van Leeuwen & Haun, 2014). 308 
The guiding copying mechanism is exactly the same as in the previous model, i.e. 309 
random copying remains the only form of copying. The only twist in our new model is 310 
that innovation rate decreases over time, mimicking individuals gradually converging 311 
on a certain variant preference (we believe this to be a realistic scenario). The results are 312 
analogous to the previous model: an analysis based on individuals shows perfect 313 
linearity in keeping with the random copying default, but an analysis based on 314 
behaviours reveals a sigmoidal relation between copying probability and the variant 315 
frequency in the population (see Figure 2). The reason for this result is that an initial 316 
innovation rate creates a situation in which both behaviours become present – similar to 317 
the random mixture of behaviours with which the populations were initialised in the 318 
first model – and, after that, populations again converge on one of the two behaviours, 319 
as innovation becomes less influential. Regardless, it is striking that even in the more 320 
typically studied scenario of naive individuals exploring a novel cultural landscape (the 321 
conformist transmission scenario), the illusion of conformist transmission can still 322 
emerge when analysis focuses on behaviours instead of individuals. 323 
 324 
FIGURE 2. 325 
 326 
 In conclusion, for reasons of conceptual, empirical and methodological clarity, 327 
we propose to keep the study of conformity and conformist transmission restricted to 328 
the level of individuals and pursue the study of the effects of repetitive exposure to 329 
stimuli or behaviours, regardless of their executors, in its own right. Accordingly, we 330 
note that in the seminal conformity studies “the majority” did not consist of behaviours 331 
but individuals. For instance, in the Asch studies (1956), “the majority” was assembled 332 
by a group of confederates each expressing one opinion, not by one confederate 333 
expressing his/her opinion multiple times (for studies on the (mere) exposure effect, see 334 
e.g. Bornstein, 1989; Zajonc, 1968). 335 
 336 
The pivotal role of observation records 337 
Finally, we wish to draw attention to the most prominent matter highlighted by van 338 
Leeuwen and colleagues (2015) in reference to the study of conformity in particular and 339 
social learning biases in general: observation records. Underlying all previous 340 
considerations, e.g. whether or not the social learning rule ‘copy high-rankers’ could 341 
explain the patterns described in van de Waal et al. (2013), lies the implicit assumption 342 
that the respective decision-makers have observed all available social information. We 343 
challenge this assumption and wish to emphasize that when it comes down to 344 
pinpointing (social) learning biases, it is essential that observation records are obtained 345 
and used in analysis, especially given that such data are accessible (e.g. see van 346 
Leeuwen et al., 2013; Kendal et al., 2015). 347 
 Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) respond to our previous criticism that in 348 
their original study (van de Waal et al., 2013) it was ‘unknown what and whom the 349 
immigrating males had observed prior to their preference switching’ (van Leeuwen et 350 
al., 2015, p.3) by stating that this is true for all studies, including experimental ones like 351 
that conducted by Haun and colleagues (2012). However, our criticism did not refer to 352 
the actual observations made by individuals – we agree that a certain level of 353 
assumption, ultimately even when using eye-tracking or more advanced technologies, is 354 
unavoidable. Instead, our criticism pertained to the assumption that the immigrants were 355 
somehow able to obtain knowledge of the available social information. The immigrant 356 
vervets’ observation records were entirely absent in the original study claiming to have 357 
identified conformity (van de Waal et al., 2013) and remain too imprecise for the 358 
investigation of conformity in the follow-up analysis (Whiten & van de Waal, this 359 
volume). In the first instance, we refer to records of what/whom the vervets could have 360 
observed because they were present when the social information (which would need to 361 
be quantified per observation bout) was available. In the second instance, head 362 
orientation during the inadvertent demonstrations seems a crucial measure to report. 363 
Such measures provide the necessary information to link an individual’s observational 364 
input (in this case: social information) to an individual’s behavioural output (in this 365 
case: maintaining or adjusting food colour preference), and thus the relevant 366 
information to draw conclusions on individuals’ specific learning biases. 367 
 Another example of individuals’ observation records receiving insufficient 368 
consideration concerns the recent great tit study by Aplin and colleagues (2015b). While 369 
this study provides detailed analyses of the birds’ tendencies to learn socially,  370 
including, importantly, their propensities to copy in response to different majority sizes, 371 
the very data central to their conformist transmission analyses rest on assumptions 372 
rather than observations. The authors derived an external measure of which birds 373 
typically flocked together and calculated an average ‘group length’ of flocking (i.e. 245 374 
seconds) that was subsequently used during the experiment in order to assume that all 375 
birds operating the experimental task in this time-window obtained knowledge of each 376 
other’s choices. In other words, the authors did not score which birds were 377 
simultaneously present at the experimental task (or which birds observed each other), 378 
but instead relied on the assumption that the birds were in the vicinity of the 379 
experimental task at the same time as the birds that were considered to be 380 
“demonstrators”, and the further assumption that they paid attention to those 381 
demonstrations (see Aplin et al., 2015b). We feel this to be an unfortunate caveat in an 382 
otherwise excellently conceived and conducted study. Regardless of the plausibility of 383 
such assumptions, observational input is the very measure from which we aim to derive 384 
conclusions on individual’s (social) learning biases, which, in our view, makes it 385 
imperative to be as accurate as possible. We wonder, for instance, whether the birds 386 
with the most extreme copying probabilities (0 and 100%) had observed that the entire 387 
sub-group of their sub-population had not converged on one particular strategy (see 388 
Figure 1 in Aplin et al., 2015a). These data seem crucial for the sigmoidal pattern to 389 
emerge, which was used to argue for conformist transmission in the birds’ social 390 
learning patterns (Aplin et al., 2015b). Notably, new modelling insights show that this 391 
very sigmoidal pattern can emerge in the absence of individuals’ being conformist 392 
biased (Acerbi et al., under review), making it even more pertinent to know what the 393 
birds observed exactly. 394 
395 
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Figure Legends 477 
 478 
 479 
Figure 1. A population of N=100 individuals is randomly initialised with one of two 480 
behaviours. At each time step, a model and an observer are randomly extracted from the 481 
population, and the observer always copies the model. The simulation ends at 10,000 482 
time steps, i.e. 10,000 possible interactions. Results are based on 1,000 replications of 483 
the model. Simulated data are fitted with a linear and a sigmoid model. Copying 484 
probability is plotted against frequency of individuals (a), and frequency of behaviours 485 
(b). 486 
 487 
 488 
Figure 2. Simulations start with a population of N=100 naïve individuals. At each time 489 
step there is a probability that an individual, randomly extracted from the population, 490 
will innovate, i.e. will introduce, with equal probability, one of the two possible 491 
behaviours. Probability of innovation is initially equal to μ=.1 (one innovation every 10 492 
time steps on average), and decreases exponentially with time, according to 𝑒
−5𝑡
𝑇⁄ , 493 
where t is the current time step, and T is the maximum amount of time steps. In 494 
addition, at each time step, a model and an observer are randomly extracted from the 495 
population, and the observer always copies the model. The simulation ends at 10,000 496 
time steps, i.e. 10,000 possible interactions. Results are based on 1,000 replications of 497 
the model. Simulated data are fitted with a linear and a sigmoid model. Copying 498 
probability is plotted against frequency of individuals (a), and frequency of behaviours 499 
(b). 500 
